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IN THE SUPRErvlE COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH

.1.\ Y:\' E \\YETI-IEitELL CH.ASE,

Plain tiff- Appellant~
Case No.
9919

vs.
I•: I>\\' l X

"\~lOS

Cllr\SE, JR.,

Defendant-ll es pond ent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE"'IENT OF 'THE CASE
The defendant, haYing been divorced by plaintiff
in 1961. sought by this action to have the decree of
divorce nwdified to award custody of a Ininor child of
the marriage to him.

DISPOSITIOX IX LO,VER COURT
At a hearing held on )lay 6, 1963, pursuant to
tlefendant's order to show cause, the District Court of
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the Fifth Judicial District, Hon. C. Nelson Day presiding, found that the child's welfare and interest would
best be served by awarding custody to defendant and
ordered that custody of the child be accordingly awarded
to defendant subject to plaintiff's right of reasonable
visitation and terminated the requirement that defendant
pay child support. ( R. 29-30).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Nephi,
Utah, on August 29, 1958. (R. 16, 27). A child, Robert
Leon Chase, was born to the marriage on October 10,
1960. (R. 16, 27).
On March 11, 1961, the District Court of the Fifth
Judicial District, Hon. Will L. Hoyt presiding, entered a Judgment and decree of divorce which, among
other things, awarded plaintiff a divorce from defendant; awarded custody of the boy, Robert Leon Chase,
to plaintiff and required defendant to pay $1.00 per
month alimony and $60.00 per month child support to
plaintiff. (R. 14, 15, 27).
About the first of March, 1961, plaintiff moved
from Nephi to Salt Lake City, Utah, leaving the boy
with her parents, the boy's maternal grandparents, and
from that time to the date of the hearing in question,
with the exception of one week in the first part of Noveinber, 1962, plaintiff has lived in Salt Lake City and
the boy has remained with her parents in Nephi. ( Tr.
56-60).
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From the tin1e plaintiff moved to Salt Lake City.
she has been regularly employed and at the time of the
henring was earning in the neighborhood of $390.00 per
month. ( Tr. 56).
On .July :!H, 1962, the plaintiff married Harry F.
Ilam's, to whmn she was still married at the date of the
hearing, ( 'l'r. ;)..J.-55) and about October 1, 1962, moved
into the home where they resided at the date of the
hearing. ( Tr. 55). Plaintiff's present husband is an insurance salesman and earns in excess of $500.00 per
month. ( Tr. 56). Plaintiff and her husband live in a
two-bedroom duplex apartment in Salt Lake City. (Tr.
:w).

From the date of the divorce, defendant has lived
in Xephi and has worked as a cook in a local cafe, where
he now holds the position of chef, supervising the employment of several employees. (Tr. 5, 11, 44). His
salary at the time of the hearing was $500.00 per month
before deductions. ( Tr. 6). His employer testified
that he expects to expand his operations and to elevate
defendant to a position of greater responsibility in his
organization. ( Tr. 45, 46).
Defendant retnarried on June 26, 1961, and lives
with his present wife and eight month old (at the time
of the hearing) daughter in a two bedroom duplex
in Xephi. (Tr. 5, 9-10). Defendant's wife is not workmg.
Defendant has n1ade all alimony payments regularly and on ti1ne and has visited with the boy and has
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had him in his home three or four times per week since
the original divorce. (Tr. 4, 7-8, 37).
There is some discrepancy in the record with regard
to the frequency of plaintiff's visits. Plaintiff testified
that she visited her son in Nephi every weekend and
stayed from Friday night to Sunday. (Tr. 57). Plaintiff's husband testified that they visited "at least every
other week.'' (Tr. 66).
Both plaintiff and her husband work full-time.
Plaintiff testified that she planned to continue working
until their furniture and two 1963 cars were paid off,
that is, until October, 1963, (Tr. 56-57) and that as
soon as they were paid off~ she would " ... quit work
and bring Robbie up with me." (Tr. 56). Plaintiff
also testified that she had originally planned to place
the boy in a nursery school until that time but later
changed her mind and decided to leave the child in Nephi
because she "didn't want to fight with them." (Tr. 60).
Plaintiff also testified that she can quit work if necessary. (Tr. 58).
On one occasion, about the first of November,
1962, plaintiff, over the objections of defendant and
plaintiff's parents, removed the child from the care of
her parents and took him to Salt Lake City. Two days
after making the change, she placed him in a day nursery where he spent the following five days, during the
hours from 8 :00 a.m. to 5 :30 p.m., until plaintiff's
1nother came to Salt Lake City from Nephi and pre-
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,·ailed upon plaintiff to allow her to take the child back
to ~ephi with her. (Tr. 19, :!a-:n. 58-61).
Plaintiff testified that during the pendency of the
divon·e proceedings she was earning $200.00 per month
working for her father. (Tr. 63-64). In addition,
plnintitl"s counsel elicited testimony to the effect that
prior to the entry of the decree of divorce the Court
otfered plaintiff $170.00 per month alimony and child
support if she would stay with the child, which she ret'usnl. ( Tr. L>. 21; R. 10).
The boy is physically and mentally healthy, (Tr.
although an impending discipline problem was mentioned at various stages of the testimony. ( Tr. 13, 39,

71)

6ti-ti7, 68-70).

Both couples are In their early twenties and are
physically and mentally fit. Both couples are financially
able to provide for themselves and for the child. Plaintill' (Tr. 58, 60) and her husband (Tr. 65) and defendant ( Tr. 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24) and his wife
(Tr. :37-39) have all expressed a love for the boy and
a desire to have hi1n live in their respective homes. There
is no real showing that either of the parties are morally
unfit or that the family groups into which they propose
to place the boy would have a negative moral influence
on him.
After finding that plaintiff had "evidenced not an
entire lack of attention, but certainly not what would
he expected of a mother who was greatly concerned
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about her child ... " ( R. 29), the trial court held that
the child" .. would be better off by having a more stable
home environment and the care and attention of parents
who love and care for him in their home." (R. 29),
and ordered that custody of the child be awarded to
defendant subject to the plaintiff's right of reasonable
visitation and accordingly discontinued the requirement
that defendant pay child support payments to the plaintiff. ( R. 29-30) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION
OF ISSUES OF FACT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ABSENT A CLEAR SHOWING OF
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
This court has repeatedly held that it would not
disturb a trial court's judgment with regard to findings
in matters in equity on appeal unless it appears
to be unjust, inequitable, and contrary to the evidence
and therefore an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Ut. ( 2d) 263, 323 P. ( 2d) 16. In that case this
court said:
"Due to the equitable nature of such proceedings, the proper adjudication of which is highly
dependent upon personal equations which the
trial court is in an advantaged position to appraise, he is allowed considerable latitude of discretion and his orders will not be disturbed unless
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it appears that there has been a plain abuse thereof."

In the recent ease of Wilson, et u,r. v.

Pierce~

14 Ut.

(~d) ....• 383 P.(:!d) 925, handed down this year, this
court stated that:

''Beeause of his close contact with the parties
and the opportunity it affords him [the trial
eourt) to form a judgment not only of their
veracity, but of their qualities of character and
sincerity of purpose, which are particularly important factors in proceedings of this kind, we
1nake due allowance for his advantaged position;
and in accord with the traditional rule, review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and decree; and will not disturb them unless
it is shown to clearly preponderate to the contrary. Nokes v. Continental Min. Co., 6 Ut.
(2d) 177, 308 P. (2d) 954."
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND
Tl-IAT THE BEST INTEREST AND WELFARE OF THE MINOR CHILD WOULD
BEST BE SERVED BY A 'VARDING CUSTODlr OF SAID CHILD TO HIS FATHER.
The record and transcript disclose a marked similarity in a great many of the qualifications presented
by both parties in their suit to gain the custody of the
boy. Both parties ha Ye remarried and are establishing
homes in houses suitable for the rearing of a small boy.
Both couples are young, physically and mentally fit
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and are financially able to provide for the1nselves and
the boy. Although there is some evidence disparaging
the moral fitness of the parties, it is submitted that there
is not and cannot be serious dispute with the proposition
that neither party would, if given the opportunity,
expose the child to adverse moral influences. As the
court said in UTilson~ et 1w:. v. Pierce~ supra:
"As is quite usual in these cases, the contend·
ing parties sought to disparage each other as
unfit to rear this child. While there was some
evidence in support of their respective accusations, it must be appraised in the light of the
facts that the parties felt obliged to engage in
such recriminations; and that we are not dealing
with angels, but with human beings who are
prone to frailty. In spite of these efforts to show
to the contrary, we say advisedly that there was
nothing brought out by either party to create
any real concern that the other was actually unfit
to have the child's custody."
The only real disparity in the qualifications of
the contending parties manifests itself in a comparison
of the parties' respective capacities to give the necessary
love and personal attention to the child.
The evidence on one hand shows that plaintiff could
have remained in Nephi, financially comfortable, and
kept the child with her and thereby afforded herself
an opportunity to give such personal attention and love
and affection to the boy. Instead, for reasons personal
to herself, she chose to leave the child in the care of her
parents in Nephi and move to Salt Lake City. In addi-
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t ion.

nt'ter she had retnarried and moved to a home

which she testified was suitable and large enough for the
l·hild and with an income large enough so that it was
not necessary that she work, she still put off bringing
the <.'hild to live with her until she had accomplished
other objediYes which apparently seemed more important to her. such as paying off two 1963 automobiles
nnd cmnpleting paytnent on household furnishings and
other personal possessions. And when she did bring the
child to Salt Lake City she did not give him her personal
attention, love and support during the difficult time
of adjusting to a new family and surroundings, but
instead placed him in a day nursery where he spent
virtually all of his waking hours until his grandmother
rescued him one week later.
On the other hand, the evidence shows that the
defendant has taken every opportunity to be with the
boy and on such occasions spent considerable time with
him and has given him a great deal of attention and has
amply demonstrated his love to the boy. Also, it is
,·ery significant to note that the defendant's present
wife has wholeheartedly joined in these occasions and
has also made a separate and substantial effort to give
the boy the love of a mother which he had theretofore
missed and has expended considerable effort in taking
the boy on excursions and in making clothes and other
gifts for hin1. ~--\.ccordingly, the trial court found that
the child·s interest would best be served and the child's
welfare best promoted if the custody of the child was
placed in the fatnily where he would be assured of re11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ceiving the love and attention which he needs. The trial
court's fiindings should be affirmed.

POINT III
THE CONTROLLING OBJECTIYE IN
AWARDING CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD
OF DIVORCED PARENTS IS THE PRO~IO
TION OF THE BEST INTEREST AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD.
The authority in support of this proposition is so
overwhelming that respondent makes no argument except to cite the following leading and recent cases:
McBroom v. McBroom~ 14 Ut. (2d) .... , ____ P. (2d)
____ , (handed down in August, 1963); Wilson~ et ux. v.
Pierce~ supra; Johnson v. Johnson~ supra; Steiger v.
Seiger~ 4 Ut. (2d) 273, 293 P. (2d) 418, 420; Walton
v. Coffman et ux.~ 110 Utah 1, 169 P. (2d) 97; Sees.
30-3-5 and 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF HAD NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT
TO THE CUSTODY OF HER MINOR CHILD
MERELY BECAUSE THERE "\iV AS NO FINDING THAT SHE 'VAS UNFIT.
While there is no contention that plaintiff is unfit,
there is no absolute right, as argued by her in her brief
on appeal, of a divorced mother to have custody of her
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minor l'hildren 1nerely because there is no finding that
she was an unfit parent. This has been the established
law in Utah since the decision in Johnson v. Johnson,
supra. and this court has recently handed down two
decisions in accord with this view, Wilson et ux v. Pierce,
suprn, and JlcBroom t'. McBroo'Tn, supra.

POINT V.
PLAINTIFF HAS 'V AIVED ANY RIGHT
TO THE CCSTODY OF HER MINOR CHILD .
.~. \s

has heretofore been shown, plaintiff has had the
right, the opportunity and ability from the date of the
original divorce decree to the date of the hearing to
han· the child and for reasons of her own has failed
and neglected to do so. It is respectfully contended
that she has thereby waived any paramount right she
may have, statutory or otherwise, to have custody of
this l·hild as opposed to the right of her ex-husband, the
defendant. Alley v. Alley, 72 Utah 196, 269 Pac. 487.
POINT VI.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DISINCLINATION
TO A'YARD COUNSEL FEES TO THE
PLAIXTIFF SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
ABSENT ...-\. CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE
COlTRT ABl'SED ITS DISCRETION .
..-\ ,·ery comprehensive annotation dealing with
this precise point Inay be found at 15 A.L.R. ( 2d) 1270
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at p. 1272. See also Scott v. Scott~ 105 Utah 376, Ht
P. (2d) 198; Anderson v. Anderson~ 110 Utah 300, 17~
P. (2d) 132.

POINT ·vii.
THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER ASSESSING THE RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING 'V HE T HE R COUNSEL FEES
SHOULD BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF,
CORRECTLY DECLINED TO MAKE SUCH
AWARD.
There is no contention or showing that the expenditures for counsel fees made by plaintiff to resist defendant's motion were made for the benefit of the minor
child or should be properly classified as a necessary.
15 A.L.R. (2d) 1282. Moreover, the record clearly
shows that plaintiff is in a better relative financial position to pay these expenses than is defendant. 15 A.L.R.
1281.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly found that the defendant
and his present wife were better able to provide the love
and attention which the minor child, Robert Leon Chase,
required and that it was in the child's best interest and
that it would serve to promote the welfare of the child
if the custody were to be granted to the parent best able
to provide such love and attention and, concluding that
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there was no overriding legal right possessed by plaintift'. accordingly granted said custody to the defendant.
l I:n·ing granted custody to the defendant, there was
uo longer any reason for the continuation of the requirement that the defendant pay $60.00 per month
child support to plaintiff and the trial court correctly
terminated such obligation.
At'ter taking into consideration the effect of the
plaintifi''s action in resisting defendant's motion upon
the welfare of said minor child, as well as the relative
financial ability of the families to pay for said resist:mce, the trial court correctly declined to award plaintiff's attorney's fees for the hearing.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's
order should be affirmed and that plaintiff should be
required to pay her own attorney's fees on this appeal
for the reasons stated in support of the denial of attorney's fees in connection with the proceedings here appealed from.

Respectfully sub1nitted this 12th day of September,
1963.

JAMES F. HOUSLEY
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
...-\. ttorney for Defendant-Respondent
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